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ABSTRACT
Previous research has shown that people make systematically diﬀerent
decisions when faced with a moral dilemma in a native than in a foreign
language [e.g. Costa, A., A. Foucart, S. Hayakawa, M. Aparici,
J. Apesteguia, J. Heafner, and B. Keysar. 2014. “Your Morals Depend on
Language.” PLoS One 9 (4): e94842]. The aim of the current study is to
test the limits of this so-called Foreign-Language Eﬀect by examining (1)
whether it holds for highly proﬁcient bilinguals of a closely related
language pair (i.e. Dutch-English), and (2) whether it can be replicated in
an auditory setting. In Experiment 1, 60 Dutch-English bilinguals read
moral dilemmas in Dutch or in English, whereas in Experiment 2, a
diﬀerent sample of 60 Dutch-English bilinguals listened to the same
dilemmas. After reading or listening, participants’ task was to indicate
whether the proposed action was appropriate or not. The results showed
that the Foreign-Language Eﬀect was absent in Experiment 1, but present
in Experiment 2. These ﬁndings aid in understanding the robustness of
the Foreign-Language Eﬀect, revealing that in some contexts it may be
overcome and/or inhibited, whereas in others it may be enhanced.
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Introduction
Individuals make thousands of decisions every day. Such decisions can be relatively small or may
have a larger impact on life. For example, imagine you are walking in a shopping street and you
ﬁnd a wallet with lots of money. What will you do? Will you bring the wallet with the money to
the police station or will you keep it? The ability to make moral decisions is an important aspect
of social competence in humans. Previous research has shown that people make systematically diﬀer-
ent decisions when faced with a moral dilemma in a native (L1) than in a foreign language (L2) (e.g.
Costa et al. 2014). This is also known as the Foreign-Language Eﬀect (henceforth FLE) (Keysar,
Hayakawa, and An 2012). Typically, previous work on the FLE asked participants to read moral
dilemmas. Moreover, most of the FLE studies tested bilingual participants whose L1 was typologi-
cally distant from their L2. A disadvantage of relying on text and focusing on relatively distant
L1–L2 language pairs is that it raises issues of generalizability of the obtained results. The aim of
the current study is to test the limits of the FLE by examining (1) whether it holds for highly proﬁ-
cient bilinguals of a closely related language pair (i.e. Dutch-English), and (2) whether it can be repli-
cated in an auditory setting.
Moral decision making has been deﬁned as ‘evaluating the (good vs. bad) actions or character of a
person that are made with respect to a set of virtues held to be obligatory by a culture or subculture’
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(Haidt 2001, 817). Traditional theories of moral development have emphasised the role of controlled
cognition in moral decision making (e.g. Kohlberg 1969), while more recent theories have high-
lighted the role of automatic emotional processes (e.g. Haidt 2001). Other researchers have proposed
a dual-process theory (e.g. Greene et al. 2001; Kahneman 2003), according to which moral decision
making is driven by a complex interaction between rational and emotional processes. In this dual-
process account, controlled processes typically support judgments favouring the greater good by
maximising beneﬁts and minimising costs across aﬀected individuals (i.e. utilitarian decisions;
Mill [1861] 1998), while emotional processes generally support judgments that favour the essential
rights and duties of a person (i.e. deontological decisions; Kant [1785] 1959).
Previous research has shown that the relative weight of rational and intuitive processes in moral
decision making can vary, and lead to more or less utilitarian or deontological choices. Recent studies
have shown that moral decisions depend on whether they are made on the basis of information pre-
sented in an L1 or L2 (e.g. Cipolletti, McFarlane, andWeissglass 2016; Costa et al. 2014; Geipel, Had-
jichristidis, and Surian 2015b; Hayakawa et al. 2017). In Costa et al. (2014), bilinguals (i.e. Korean-
English, English-Spanish, Spanish-English, English/Spanish-Hebrew, and English-French) con-
sidered the classic Footbridge dilemma (Foot 1978) in which ﬁve people tied to a train track are
about to be killed by an oncoming train. The only way to save them would be to push a large bystan-
der onto the tracks, thereby killing him but stopping the train. Only 18% of participants were willing
to sacriﬁce the large man (utilitarian decision) when the problem was presented in their L1, whereas
44% were willing to do so when it was presented in their L2. However, this pattern was not found on
the Switch dilemma. In this dilemma, a train is headed towards ﬁve workmen but participants can
now choose to switch the train to another track using a lever where it would kill only one man. Pull-
ing the lever is considered as less emotionally aversive and less personal (as it does not involve direct
contact with the victim) than pushing a man on the tracks. According to Greene et al. (2008, 1146),
The Footbridge dilemma is a personal dilemma because it involves (a) a serious bodily harm (b) to
one or more particular individuals, where (c) this harm is not the result of deﬂecting an existing
threat. In contrast, the Switch dilemma is an impersonal dilemma as it lacks one or more character-
istics of the personal dilemma. The authors argued that thinking in an L2 creates emotional distan-
cing compared to thinking in an L1. This reduction in emotionality might increase rational processes
and thus lead to an increase in utilitarian choices. This distinctive moral decision pattern between
personal and impersonal moral dilemmas has been replicated by Cipolletti et al. (2016), who studied
English-Spanish bilinguals.
Although Geipel et al. (2015b) mostly replicated the results of Costa et al. (2014), they argued that
the FLE was not driven by an attenuation of emotions. In Experiment 3 in Geipel et al. (2015b), they
presented two additional moral dilemmas besides the personal Footbridge and the impersonal
Switch dilemma to German-English bilinguals. The ﬁrst dilemma was personal and high in emotion
(Crying baby) and the second one was impersonal and low in emotion (Lost wallet). In the Crying
baby dilemma, one must decide whether to smother one’s own child in order to save oneself and
several others from being found and killed by enemy soldiers. In the Lost wallet dilemma, a person
in need must decide whether to return a wallet full of cash that seems to belong to a wealthy
individual.
Importantly, the FLE was found in the impersonal Lost wallet dilemma and the personal Foot-
bridge dilemma, but it was absent in the personal Crying baby dilemma and the impersonal Switch
dilemma. The authors suggested that the outcome on the Crying baby dilemma would be negative
anyway (the child’s death), even if the action was not performed. The authors’ explanation why the
FLE was present on the Lost wallet and the Footbridge dilemma is that these dilemmas trigger social
or moral norms which prohibit people from keeping wallets or pushing other people. They therefore
concluded that social or moral norms elicit the FLE and the distinction between personal versus
impersonal, as suggested by Costa et al. (2014), is less important. This idea is in line with previous
work revealing that disapproval of violations of everyday social and moral norms (e.g. cheating in an
exam) increase in an L2 (Geipel, Hadjichristidis, and Surian 2015a; for similar views, see Dewaele
2 S. BROUWER
2010; Gawinkowska, Paradowski, and Bilewicz 2013). The current study will examine more closely
which type of dilemmas are driving the FLE.
Several diﬀerent L1–L2 language pairs have been investigated in the prior work on the FLE. What
these studies have in common is that they mainly looked at language pairs such as Spanish-English
and Korean-English that are typologically distant (Cipolletti et al. 2016; Costa et al. 2014; Geipel et al.
2015b), except for Hayakawa et al. (2017) who also included one closely related language pair in their
experiments (i.e. English-German and vice versa) and for Geipel et al. (2015b) who included Ger-
man-English in their Experiment 3. As these studies have demonstrated an eﬀect of language on
moral decision making, it in the ﬁrst instance appears to be a robust ﬁnding across a rather wide
variety of language pairs. However, evidently, not all languages have been under investigation yet.
The language pair tested here, which has not been studied before, will be Dutch-English.1 Dutch
is, like English, a West-Germanic language and is one of the closest relatives of English. Dutch
and English are not only linguistically but also culturally related and English has been shown to
have an increasing impact in the Netherlands (Nortier 2011).
As it has been shown that amount of emotionality may inﬂuence moral decision making (e.g.
Costa et al. 2014), the ﬁnding that certain kinds of words and phrases are more emotionally intense
in participants’ L1 when heard than when read, is important (Caldwell-Harris and Ayçiçeği-Dinn
2009; Dewaele 2004; Harris, Ayçiçeği, and Gleason 2003; Harris, Gleason, and Ayçiçeği 2006; but
see Jankowiak and Korpal 2018). For example, Harris and colleagues found that childhood repri-
mands, such as ‘Shame on you!’ and ‘Go to your room!’, evoked reduced skin conductance responses
when they were read aloud in an L2. It may therefore be possible that Dutch-English bilinguals
experience no or a reduced FLE while reading written moral dilemmas, but a strong(er) FLE
while listening to spoken moral dilemmas. This idea is consistent with prior work that has demon-
strated that listeners’ expectations of a speaker can inﬂuence the way language is processed and inter-
preted (e.g. Lev-Ari 2015; Lev-Ari and Keysar 2012). For example, listeners hold speciﬁc expectations
regarding the speech of non-native speakers (Hanulikova et al. 2012). Moreover, it has been found
that speakers’ foreign-accented speech can negatively impact the credibility of their message (Lev-Ari
and Keysar 2010).
The present study
The main purpose of the current study is to test the robustness of the FLE. In Experiment 1, the aim
was to investigate whether Dutch-English bilinguals will show a FLE when facing moral dilemmas in
Dutch (L1) compared to English (L2). Costa et al. (2014) have shown that proﬁciency in the L2 inﬂu-
ences the size of the FLE. More speciﬁcally, the increase in utilitarian decisions in an L2 was smaller
for high than for low proﬁciency participants because they have developed more emotionality in
their L2. Moreover, Ĉavar and Tytus (2018) recently showed that there was a lack of a decision-mak-
ing diﬀerence in two languages in a group of highly proﬁcient bilinguals. On the basis of these
ﬁndings, it is expected that Dutch-English bilinguals, who are typically highly proﬁcient in English,
will show no or a reduced FLE. As Geipel et al. (2015b), the aim of Experiment 1 was also to shed
more light on the link between the FLE and the character of moral dilemmas. To this end, the same
moral dilemmas as in Experiment 3 of Geipel et al. (2015b) were used, but one additional personal
and one additional impersonal dilemma was added (see Method section for more information). In
this way, it was possible to examine more closely whether the personal versus impersonal distinction
matters for the FLE to occur.
In Experiment 2, it will be investigated whether listening to moral dilemmas in an L2 (as opposed
to in an L1) can aﬀect decision making (henceforth auditory Foreign-Language eﬀect). This will pro-
vide new ecologically valid insights in how moral decision takes place in everyday life situations. The
results may have far-reaching consequences, as foreign languages are often used during meetings in
international institutes and in international companies in general. As the diﬀerence in emotional
intensity between an L1 and an L2 is accentuated during listening (Caldwell-Harris and Ayçiçeği-
JOURNAL OF MULTILINGUAL AND MULTICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 3
Dinn 2009; Dewaele 2004; Harris et al. 2003; Harris et al. 2006), it is expected that an auditory FLE
will be found, even for highly proﬁcient bilinguals of a closely related language pair. At the same time,
it is possible that listening to moral dilemmas increases participants’ cognitive load (and/or stress),
because they can, as a rule (and in this experimental set-up), only be listened to once. This contrasts
to reading moral dilemmas which can, in principle, be read back multiple times (unless under a cer-
tain time pressure), which gives participants ample time to consciously reﬂect on the dilemmas
before making a moral decision. Previous work has shown that cognitive load (e.g. Cummins and
Cummins 2012; Greene et al. 2008) and stress (e.g. Starcke, Ludwig, and Brand 2012; Youssef
et al. 2012) inﬂuence moral decision making. More speciﬁcally, it has been found that taxing cogni-
tive resources, decreases utilitarian decisions. It is thus possible that listening to spoken moral dilem-
mas, especially in the L2, increases cognitive load, which ultimately leads to a reduction in utilitarian
decisions in the L2. Finally, as in Experiment 1, it will also be investigated whether the character of the
moral dilemmas (personal versus impersonal) has an inﬂuence on the FLE in an auditory setting.
Experiment 1: written version
Method
Participants
Sixty Dutch-English participants (30 female,MAGE = 27.8 years, SDAGE = 12.3) were recruited. Thirty
participants were randomly assigned to the native language condition (Dutch) and 30 to the foreign
language condition (English). Participation was voluntary and the experimental protocol was
approved by the independent ethics committee of the Radboud University Nijmegen. On average,
participants in the foreign language condition started learning English at the age of 10 years.
They were asked to ﬁll out their self-rated proﬁciency in English in terms of speaking, listening, writ-
ing and reading on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = no knowledge, 2 = beginner, 3 = average, 4 = advanced,
5 = native-like). On average, they rated their overall English proﬁciency skills with a score of 3.60
(SD = 0.54) and their English reading skills with a score of 3.80 (SD = 0.71).
Several independent t-tests showed that participants of the Dutch language group did not diﬀer
from those of the English language group on the self-rated linguistic background measures (listening
in Dutch t(58) = −1.98, p = .052; reading in Dutch t(58) =−1.88, p = .07; listening in English t(58) =
−.21; p = .84; reading in English: t(58) =−.17, p = .86; Age of English onset t(58) = .24, p = .82; Eng-
lish proﬁciency: t(58) = .11, p = .92). This reveals that, although results are based on a between-sub-
jects design, the participants assigned to the native and foreign language groups were comparable.
Note that most of the previous work on FLE studies tested sequential bilinguals, who had acquired
their L2 in a classroom setting. Although the current study included bilinguals with the same
language proﬁle, the bilingual situation of Dutch-English bilinguals is rather diﬀerent from the bilin-
guals in the previous research, as they are known to approach ﬂuency in their L2. More speciﬁcally, a
study by the European Commission (2012) has shown that the Netherlands is one of the most multi-
lingual nations in Europe. In a questionnaire, 94% of Dutch respondents indicated that they were able
to speak at least one other language besides their mother tongue, with English the most commonly
spoken of these foreign languages. Ninety percent of the respondents speciﬁed they had suﬃcient
English in order to have a conversation. The Netherlands has thus for a reason been named the
ﬁrst country in the world (out of 80 countries) with the highest proﬁciency in the English language
(Education First 2012). Nowadays, English is the oﬃcial language in 74% of master studies and 23%
of bachelor studies (VSNU 2018). The multilingual nature of the Netherlands, is argued to be one of
the major reasons that accounts for the high level of English proﬁciency among Dutch inhabitants.
Materials
The same moral dilemmas were used as in Experiment 3 in Geipel et al. (2015b). They presented
two personal (i.e. Footbridge, Crying baby) and two impersonal dilemmas (i.e. Switch, Lost
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wallet) to participants. In the current study, one additional dilemma of each type was added
(personal: Vitamins; impersonal: Taxes), resulting in six moral dilemmas in total (see Table 1
and the Appendix for complete descriptions). In the Vitamins dilemma, one must decide
whether or not to remove a man’s kidneys in order to save the lives of six other people. The
man will not die if you do this, but his health will be compromised. In the Taxes dilemma,
you are the owner of a business trying to make ends meet. One must decide whether it is appro-
priate to pretend that certain personal expenses are business expenses in order to lower taxes.
The mean emotion ratings of these two additional dilemmas (as measured by Koenigs et al.
2007, see their supplementary material) matched closely with the mean emotion ratings of
the dilemmas in Geipel et al. (2015b).
In addition to the six moral dilemmas, three ﬁller dilemmas were presented. Note that
although these dilemmas can be construed as moral, they are distinct from the experimental
dilemmas because they do not directly pit a deontological versus utilitarian choice but rather a
choice between self-interest and common good. The same two ﬁllers were used (i.e. Train or
bus (slightly adjusted to the Dutch situation), Plant transport) as in Geipel, Hadjichristidis,
and Surian (2015b) and another self-made one was added (i.e. Spaghetti; see Appendix). The
Train or bus dilemma concerned a choice between travelling by bus or train given certain
time constraints. The Plant transport dilemma involved a choice between doing multiple car
trips (vs. a single car trip) to avoid ruining a car’s upholstery. The Spaghetti dilemma concerned
a choice between eating spaghetti leftovers versus dining out. The purpose of these dilemmas was
to assess whether participants in the foreign language condition understood the English materials.
The Train or bus dilemma was designed to induce a high rate of endorsements (i.e. utilitarian
decisions). If there would be language misunderstandings, the endorsement rate should be around
50%. The Plant transport and Spaghetti dilemmas were concerned with self-interest (multiple car
trips (polluting); going out to eat (wasting food)) versus common good (one car trip; eating left-
overs). A ‘No’ answer was therefore coded as an utilitarian response (i.e. not using the car mul-
tiple times; not going out to eat).
The dilemmas were originally written in English (except for the Spaghetti dilemma). They were
translated into Dutch by two native Dutch speakers who are highly proﬁcient in English (C1 and C2
level). The translations were then compared and adjusted in consultation. The word count of the
dilemmas in both languages were kept as equal as possible (M = 103.3 for Dutch and M = 103.2
for English).
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a quiet room. Participants received instructions and the moral
dilemmas entirely written in one language: Dutch or English. Participants’ task was to judge the
appropriateness of the proposed action by circling ‘yes’ (utilitarian decision) or ‘no’ (deontological
decision) on the form. The order of dilemma presentation was randomised across participants. After
this, participants ﬁlled out a (language) background questionnaire. The whole session lasted about
15 min.
Table 1. Overview of the characteristics of the moral dilemmas.
Type of dilemma Dilemma Mean emotion rating*
Personal Footbridge 6.0 (high)
Crying baby 6.8 (high)
Vitamins 6.8 (high)
Impersonal Lost wallet 2.9 (low)
Switch 5.3 (low)
Taxes 2.7 (low)
*As reported by Koenigs et al. (2007), on a scale from 1 to 7.
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Results and discussion
Data were analysed using a mixed-eﬀects logistic regression model (Jaeger 2008) with moral decision
as the binary dependent variable (0 = deontological, no; 1 = utilitarian, yes). A logistic linking func-
tion was used to deal with the categorical nature of the dependent variable. In this type of regression,
the dependent variable is not directly ﬁtted but it models the probability (in terms of logits) associ-
ated with the values of the dependent variable.
To assess the inﬂuence of language and/or the type of moral dilemmas on moral decisions, a 2 × 2
model with Language (native vs. foreign) as one contrast-coded ﬁxed eﬀect, Dilemma type (personal
vs. impersonal) as the other contrast-coded ﬁxed eﬀect, and their interaction, was conducted. A
second analysis focused on the ﬁller dilemmas by conducting a model of moral decision with
Language (native versus foreign) as one contrast-coded ﬁxed eﬀect. The maximal random eﬀects
structure included intercepts for participants but not for items, given that there were few items,
which diﬀered on purpose in many respects (see Table 1), were included in this sample. Random
slopes for Language, Dilemma type and/or Norm violation by participants were added but those
models never converged.
Figure 1A shows the percentage of utilitarian decisions on each dilemma. Table 2 outlines the
results of the mixed-eﬀects logistic regression model. The analysis on the moral dilemmas demon-
strated no signiﬁcant eﬀect of Language, Dilemma type, or their interaction. The analysis on the ﬁller
dilemmas showed no signiﬁcant eﬀect of Language.
These results reveal that the FLE, an increase in the rate of utilitarian decisions in an L2 versus
an L1, was not present. This is inconsistent with previous work which has shown a relation
between moral decision making and language on personal dilemmas (Cipolletti et al. 2016;
Costa et al. 2014) for several language pairs. At the same time, it is in line with the ﬁndings
that highly proﬁcient bilinguals may not or to a lesser extent experience a FLE (Ĉavar and
Tytus 2018), as they have developed more emotionality in their L2 (Costa et al. 2014; Geipel et
al. 2015b). Moreover, it is possible that the FLE does not appear for closely related language
pairs, although it has been shown for German-English and English-German bilinguals (Geipel et
al. 2015b; Hayakawa et al. 2017).
As previous research has shown that phrases can be more emotionally intense in participants’ L1
when heard than when read (e.g. Caldwell-Harris and Ayçiçeği-Dinn 2009; Dewaele 2004; Harris et
al. 2003; Harris et al. 2006), Experiment 2 investigated whether the FLE is present in an auditory
setting.
Experiment 2: auditory version
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, except that the dilemmas were presented auditorily.
Method
Participants
Sixty Dutch-English participants (32 female,MAGE = 29.5 years, SDAGE = 14.5) were recruited. Thirty
participants were randomly assigned to the native language condition (Dutch) and 30 to the foreign
language condition (English). On average, participants in the foreign language condition started
learning English at the age of 10 years. They were asked to ﬁll out their self-rated proﬁciency in Eng-
lish in terms of speaking, listening, writing and reading on a 5-point scale (1 = no knowledge, 2 =
beginner, 3 = average, 4 = advanced, 5 = native-like). On average, participants in the foreign language
condition rated their overall English skills with a score of 3.47 (SD = 0.49) and their English listening
skills with a score of 3.67 (SD = 0.55).
Several independent t-tests showed that participants of the Dutch language group did not diﬀer
from those of the English language group on most of the linguistic background measures
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(tDUTCHREADING(58) =−1.51, p = .14; tENGLISHLISTENING(58) = −.01, p = 1.00; tENGLISHREADING(58)
= .62, p = .53; tENGLISHPROFICIENCY(58) = .57, p = .57). There were, however, diﬀerences between the
groups in their age of English onset (tAGEOFENGLISHONSET(58) = 2.71, p = .009) and their Dutch listen-
ing skills (tDUTCHLISTENING(58) =−2.04, p = .047). The Dutch group learnt English at a mean age of
Figure 1. Mean percentage of utilitarian decisions by dilemma and language (native language = Dutch, foreign language = Eng-
lish) in (A) Experiment 1 (written version) and (B) Experiment 2 (auditory version). NB: Footbridge = personal; Crying baby = per-
sonal; Vitamins = personal; Switch = impersonal; Lost wallet = impersonal; Taxes = impersonal.
Table 2. Results of the glmer models for Experiment 1 (written version).
Analysis 1: Personal versus impersonal distinction
Estimate SE z-value p-value
Intercept −0.62 0.13 −4.95 <0.0001
Language 0.05 0.25 0.21 0.84
Dilemma type 0.30 0.22 1.34 0.18
Language:Dilemma type −0.10 0.45 −0.23 0.82
Analysis 2: Filler dilemmas
Estimate SE z-value p-value
Intercept 0.38 0.15 2.52 0.01
Language 0.14 0.30 0.46 0.65
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11 (SD = 1.43), whereas the English group learnt English at the age of 10.2 years (SD = 1.02). This age
diﬀerence has no serious consequences for their bilingual status (i.e. between being a simultaneous or
a sequential bilingual). The Dutch group rated their Dutch listening skills with a mean of 4.77 (SD
= .50) and the English group with a mean of 4.97 (SD = .18). Both groups thus primarily rated them-
selves thus as being nativelike in Dutch.
Moreover, additional independent t-tests showed that participants in Experiment 1 did not
diﬀer from those in Experiment 2 on the linguistic background measures (age: t(118) =−.70, p
= .48; listening in English: t(118) =−1.05, p = .30; reading in English t(118) =−.54, p = .59; age
of English onset: t(118) = −1.22, p = .23; English proﬁciency: t(118) = .79; p = .43). This reveals
that the experiments included comparable participant groups. Participation was voluntary and
the experimental protocol was approved by the independent ethics committee of the Radboud Uni-
versity Nijmegen.
Materials
The same moral dilemmas were used as in Experiment 1. A native speaker of Dutch (male, 28 years
old), who ﬁnished his BA, MA and PhD at the English Language and Culture department of the Rad-
boud University, recorded the dilemmas (32 bit, 44,100 Hertz, using Adobe Audition©). This speaker
was used for both the Dutch and the English dilemmas to prevent any inﬂuence of speaker charac-
teristics on the results. He was chosen as our speaker because his English was of very high proﬁciency
(C2 level). Participants in the foreign language condition were asked to ﬁll out whether they thought
that English was the native language of the speaker on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2
= disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). On average, they rated the
speaker with a score of 3.97 (SD = 1.16). None of the participants indicated that the speaker’s native
language was other than English. Participants also rated the speaker to be easily understandable (M
= 4.17; SD = 0.95).
Procedure
Participants were tested in a quiet room. They sat in front of a laptop. The experiment was presented
using Presentation® software (Version 18.0, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA, www.
neurobs.com). Written instructions were given on the laptop screen in Dutch or English, depending
on condition assignment. The moral dilemmas were presented via headphones in randomised order.
Participants’ task was the same as in Experiment 1, except that they now had to press the arrow to the
left on the keyboard for ‘yes’ (utilitarian decision, indicated with a green sticker) or the arrow to the
right for ‘no’ (deontological decision, indicated with a red sticker).
Each trial had the following structure. First, a ﬁxation cross appeared in the centre of the screen
and participants heard the title of the dilemma followed by a second of silence. Then the participant
heard the rest of the dilemma, followed by a second of silence before the question was asked.
Immediately after this, the ﬁxation cross disappeared and the words ‘yes’ and ‘no’ appeared. From
that moment on, participants had 20 s to respond before the next trial initiated. Finally, participants
ﬁlled out a written (language) background questionnaire. The whole session took about 15 min.
Results and discussion
Figure 1B presents the percentage of utilitarian decisions on each dilemma. Table 3 outlines the
results of the mixed-eﬀects logistic regression model. Similar analyses were conducted as in Exper-
iment 1. The analysis of the data showed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of Language (estimate = .77, se = .32, z-
value = 2.34, p = .02), indicating that the odds of making a utilitarian decision are signiﬁcantly higher
in an L1 compared to an L2 (odds ratio = 2.16). This auditory FLE eﬀect did not interact with
Dilemma type. There was also no eﬀect of Dilemma type. The analysis on the ﬁller dilemmas showed
no signiﬁcant eﬀect of Language.
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General discussion
The aim of this study was to test the limits of the FLE by examining (1) whether it holds for highly
proﬁcient bilinguals of a closely related language pair (i.e. Dutch-English), and (2) whether it can be
replicated in an auditory setting.
In Experiment 1, several moral dilemmas were presented in the text to highly proﬁcient Dutch-
English bilinguals, who had to indicate whether they thought a certain action was appropriate or not.
The dilemmas were either presented in Dutch or in English. It was expected that the FLE would be
reduced or absent in this sample, as high proﬁciency in the L2 has shown to reduce (Costa et al. 2014;
Geipel et al. 2015b) or eliminate the FLE (Ĉavar and Tytus 2018). In line with this expectation, no
FLE was found, which supports the notion that increased L2 use and proﬁciency diminish emotional
distance to the L2. In other words, high proﬁciency may promote emotional grounding (Costa et al.
2014). The emotional ﬂuency in Dutch-English bilinguals may furthermore be connected to the close
cultural and typological relation between Dutch and English (Nortier 2011). Until now, the FLE has
mainly been found for a wide range of relatively distant language pairs, including English-Spanish,
Italian-English and Korean-English (L1–L2 respectively; Cipolletti et al. 2016; Costa et al. 2014; Gei-
pel et al. 2015b). As the current results show that in some cases (i.e. high proﬁciency, closely related
language pairs) individuals make more/less use of intuitive emotionally driven processes and/or
rational conscious processes, they ﬁt well with the dual-process account of moral decision making
(e.g. Greene et al. 2001; Greene and Haidt 2002; Kahneman 2003).
In Experiment 2, highly proﬁcient Dutch-English bilinguals were presented with spoken moral
dilemmas. Their task was similar to Experiment 1. It was predicted that the FLE would be present,
as previous research has shown that linguistic information can be more emotional in the L1 when
heard than when read (e.g. Caldwell-Harris and Ayçiçeği-Dinn 2009; Dewaele 2004; Harris et al.
2003; Harris et al. 2006). The results conﬁrmed this prediction: an auditory FLE was found. Individ-
uals make more utilitarian decisions when hearing a moral dilemma in their L2 than in their L1. The
eﬀect of language did not interact with dilemma type (personal versus impersonal). This ﬁnding goes
against the hypothesis that the FLE is constrained to personal dilemmas and the amount of emotion-
ality involved (see Costa et al. 2014). Note, however, that Costa et al. (2014) only collected data on the
Footbridge and the Switch dilemma using a reading task. Comparing those data with the current
reading data on the Footbridge and the Switch dilemma (Experiment 1) shows that the percentage
of utilitarian decisions in the L1 and the L2 are rather similar across the two studies.
If emotional attenuation is not the conclusive explanation for the (auditory) FLE on moral
decision making, the question remains what drives this eﬀect? Some researchers have suggested
that an L2 may inﬂuence moral decision making by reducing the mental accessibility of social
and moral rules (Geipel, Hadjichristidis, and Surian 2015a; Geipel et al. 2015b; Dewaele 2010;
Gawinkowska, Paradowski, and Bilewicz 2013). For example, Geipel and colleagues found that
the FLE was present in the Footbridge (personal) and the Lost wallet dilemma (impersonal), but
not in the Switch dilemma (impersonal). The authors argued that the ﬁrst two dilemmas involve
a prohibited action (pushing people, keeping lost wallets), whereas the third dilemma does not
Table 3. Results of the glmer models for Experiment 2 (auditory version).
Analysis 1: Personal versus impersonal distinction
Estimate SE z-value p-value
Intercept −0.75 0.17 −4.50 <0.0001
Language 0.77 0.32 2.34 0.02
Dilemma type 0.38 0.24 1.58 0.11
Language:Dilemma type −0.13 0.48 −0.26 0.79
Analysis 2: Filler dilemmas
Estimate SE z-value p-value
Intercept 0.17 0.15 1.19 0.23
Language 0.18 0.30 0.60 0.55
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(there is no general rule which prohibits people from ﬂipping switches). The current data seem to be
in line with this reasoning when only looking at the percentage of utilitarian decisions in the L1 ver-
sus the L2 on these dilemmas (see Figure 1). However, future work needs to more systematically
study this by including an equal amount of norm versus no-norm violation dilemmas. Such a
study would be able to conﬁrm whether this distinction is truly driving the (auditory) FLE.
An anonymous reviewer pointed out that for almost all dilemmas, in particular in Experiment 2,
the percentage of utilitarian responses in the L2 versus L1 was closer to 50% (with the exception of
the Switch dilemma). This could indicate that when people use an L2 they become more uncertain,
and are therefore more likely to go for a 50–50 approach (see also Geipel et al. 2015b; Muda et al.
2018). Alternatively, it could mean that the current participants found the dilemmas harder to
understand in the L2 than in the L1 and they were thus not as highly proﬁcient in their L2 as
assumed. However, this 50–50 L2 approach did not hold for the ﬁller items in both experiments.
In both cases, the response mean in the L1 was closer to 50% than the response mean in the L2.
The current research extends the previous work by revealing that listening to moral dilemmas
could elicit a FLE in highly proﬁcient bilinguals. These results ﬁt with previous work which has
shown that foreign-accented speech can negatively impact the reliability of a message (Lev-Ari
and Keysar 2010). Here, it has been demonstrated that hearing a foreign language can even inﬂuence
moral decision making, and namely promote more utilitarian-type decisions. This may have societal
consequences, as important international decisions, such as those taken at the United Nations, often
take place in auditory settings.
Note, however, that it was not possible to directly compare the written and auditory experiment,
as there were also other diﬀerences between the two set-ups (e.g. timing of presentation, ability to
review the presentation). This makes a direct comparison between these two experiments less
valid. Future research should take this into account by manipulating mode of presentation in a single
experiment. Such an experiment would, for example, also be able to asses whether the auditory con-
dition elicits more utilitarian decisions in general than the visual condition. As the results of each
experiment independently are so diﬀerent from each other, it is suggested though that the current
ﬁndings may provide evidence for the situational ethics approach (Fletcher 1997). This view
holds that the morality of an act is determined by its context rather than by judging it according
to absolute moral standards. In this case, the auditory context made individuals respond in a
more utilitarian fashion in their L2, whereas this did not occur in a written context.
There are a couple of limitations to this study. Although more moral dilemmas (six in total) were
used than in most of the previous work on the FLE, it is still a rather restricted number. Future
research should therefore present a wider variety of dilemmas. Furthermore, some of the dilemmas
that have been presented are rather distant from real life (e.g. Footbridge), although the auditory FLE
was also found on a more ordinary example (e.g. Lost wallet). It is important that future research
incorporates more realistic dilemmas like in Geipel et al. (2015a). Finally, although the number of
participants matches more or less with the number tested in Geipel et al. (2015b), other studies
on moral decision making have often included more participants but those studies presented
fewer moral dilemmas.
In light of the current study, a number of ideas for future research could be proposed. First, it
would be interesting to directly compare typologically close (e.g. Dutch-English) to typologically dis-
tant language pairs (e.g. Korean-English), while controlling for factors such as L2 proﬁciency. Sec-
ondly, it would be relevant to systematically test the role of proﬁciency on the strength of the
(auditory) FLE by including groups of L2 learners who diﬀer in their proﬁciency levels. It is thereby
important to compare L2 learners with the same L1 and L2 to control for linguistic or cultural diﬀer-
ences. In the current study, most bilinguals self-rated themselves as advanced in English (around
70%). It would be interesting for follow-up research to compare a group of participants with
more varying degrees of proﬁciency to draw stronger conclusions on the eﬀect of proﬁciency. Besides
collecting self-rated linguistic measures, as in the current study, it would be informative to also use
norm-referenced measures to assess participants’ L2 proﬁciency level. Finally, it would be important
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to further test the auditory FLE with several other language pairs to see if the current results can be
replicated.
In conclusion, the current results show that the FLE is absent in the current sample of highly
proﬁcient Dutch-English bilinguals read moral dilemmas, but it is present when they listen to
moral dilemmas. These ﬁndings aid in understanding the robustness of the FLE, revealing that in
some contexts it may be overcome and/or inhibited, whereas in others it may be strengthened.
Note
1. The Dutch-English language pair has been tested in previous studies but not in the context of moral judgment.
For example, Puntoni, De Langhe, and Van Osselaer (2009) used Dutch-English bilinguals to study the emo-
tionality of advertising messages, Geipel, Hadjichristidis, and Klesse (2018) studied willingness to consume sus-
tainable but disgusting products, and Urbig et al. (2016) studied free riding in a group context.
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Appendix: Dilemmas used in Experiment 1 and 2
(English versions, mean emotion rating (on a scale from 1 to 7) is reported by Koenigs et al. 2007).
Personal dilemmas
Footbridge (mean emotion rating: 6.0). A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward ﬁve workmen who will be
killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching
trolley and the ﬁve workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is a stranger who happens to be very large. The only way to
save the lives of the ﬁve workmen is to push this stranger oﬀ the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large body
will stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you do this, but the ﬁve workmen will be saved. Is it appropriate for you to
push the stranger on to the tracks in order to save the ﬁve workmen?
Crying baby (mean emotion rating: 6.8). Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all
remaining civilians. You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of a large house. Outside you
hear the voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for valuables. Your baby begins to cry loudly. You cover
his mouth to block the sound. If you remove your hand from his mouth his crying will summon the attention of the
soldiers who will kill you, your child, and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save yourself and the others you must
smother your child to death. Is it appropriate for you to smother your child in order to save yourself and the other
townspeople?
Vitamins (mean emotion rating: 6.8). You are the leader of a mountaineering expedition that is stranded in the
wilderness. Your expedition includes a family of six that has a genetically caused vitamin deﬁciency. A few people’s
kidneys contain large amounts of this vitamin. There is one such person in your party. The only way to save the
lives of the six members of this family is to remove one of this man’s kidneys so that the necessary vitamins may
be extracted from it. The man will not die if you do this, but his health will be compromised. The man is opposed
to this plan, but you have the power to do as you see ﬁt. Is it appropriate for you to forcibly remove this man’s kidney
in order to save the lives of the six vitamin-deﬁcient people?
Impersonal dilemmas
Switch (or Trolley) (mean emotion rating: 5.3). You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork in
the tracks. On the tracks extending to the left is a group of ﬁve railway workmen. On the tracks extending to the right is
a single railway workman. If you do nothing the trolley will proceed to the left, causing the deaths of the ﬁve workmen.
The only way to avoid the deaths of these workmen is to hit a switch on your dashboard that will cause the trolley to
proceed to the right, causing the death of the single workman. Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to save
the lives of the ﬁve workmen?
Lost wallet (mean emotion rating: 2.9). You are walking down the street when you come across a wallet lying on the
ground. You open the wallet and ﬁnd that it contains several hundred euros in cash as well the owner’s driver’s license.
From the credit cards and other items in the wallet it’s very clear that the wallet’s owner is wealthy. You, on the other
hand, have been hit by hard times recently and could really use some extra money. You consider sending the wallet
back to the owner without the cash, keeping the cash for yourself. Is it appropriate for you to keep the money you
found in the wallet in order to have more money for yourself?
Taxes (mean emotion rating: 2.7). You are the owner of a small business trying to make ends meet. It occurs to you
that you could lower your taxes by pretending that some of your personal expenses are business expenses. For example,
you could pretend that the stereo in your bedroom is being used in the lounge at the oﬃce, or that your dinners out
with your partner are dinners with clients. Is it appropriate for you to pretend that certain personal expenses are
business expenses in order to lower your taxes?
Filler dilemmas
Plant transport. You are bringing home a number of plants from a store that is about 5 km from your home. The trunk
of your car, which you’ve lined with plastic to catch the mud from the plants, will hold most of the plants you’ve pur-
chased. Is it appropriate for you to make two trips home in order to avoid ruining the upholstery of your car?
Train or bus. You need to travel from Nijmegen to Amsterdam in order to attend a meeting that starts at 2:00 pm.
You can take either the train or the bus. The train will get you there just in time for your meeting no matter what. The
bus is scheduled to arrive an hour before your meeting, but the bus is occasionally several hours late because of traﬃc.
It would be nice to have an extra hour before the meeting, but you cannot aﬀord to be late. Is it appropriate for you to
take the train instead of the bus in order to ensure you are not being late for your meeting?
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Spaghetti. You have decided that you want to live less wasteful. Yesterday you made spaghetti with fresh ingredients
for yourself for two days. Now that you are home you do not want to eat the spaghetti. If you do not eat it today, you
can eat it tomorrow. Is it appropriate for you to throw away the spaghetti and pick up something you do feel like eating
instead of the spaghetti?
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